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The debate on the alleged end of sovereignty is reigning everywhere. The proponents of
the end of sovereignty thesis argue that the sovereign state—the governments with an
absolute right to control their own territory and independence of all other states in the
international arena, that is to say having no superior authority internally and externally—is
no more. Indeed, non-governmental organisations, media, international public organiz-
ations, multinational corporations, regional blocs, terrorist groups, and even ‘stronger’
states are but a few of the entities that constantly challenge the idea of states as self-ruling,
independent entities.
It goes without saying that the process of globalisation has shaken the traditional roots
of sovereignty. The reflections of globalisation can most obviously be seen in three distinct
areas: economy, human rights and warfare. In the economic sphere, the autonomous state
in full control of ins and outs of its territory is a past story. Today, the global market forces
more easily penetrate the borders and affect the national economies in unprecedented
ways. As to the second issue; the humanitarian norms, the development of norms
concerning international protection of human rights and humanitarian law are seen to
infringe on sovereignty as they challenge the principle of non-intervention. Lastly, the
states no longer have exclusive power over of the means of violence. Therefore, as Boutros
Boutros-Ghali claimed “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty.has passed” [2].
Yet, are these factors sufficient for us to proclaim the death of sovereignty and lament
for the dead?
First of all, the question that should be asked is whether sovereignty is a stable and
unchanging institution or not. As put by Sorenson “.sovereignty is an institution based on
norms.” [3]. The word ‘norm’ is used to identify what goes as ‘normal’ at a specific
juncture in time. This means that as an institution based on norms it is natural for sovereignty
to develop and change in accordance with what is normal at the time. Thus, those who argue
that the sovereign state is just about dead may be wrong in their assumptions.Futures 37 (2005) 563–566www.elsevier.com/locate/futures0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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popular with its three necessary elements; territory, population and government. Also, the
states are still constitutionally independent though nowadays there is an intense discussion
concerning the relationship between regulative and constitutive rules. Moreover,
sovereign state seems to be still very popular in our times as many ethnic and religious
groups struggle to form their own states.
If not just about dead, what will the future shape of sovereignty look like? This question
can be approached by identifying ‘evolutionary’ effects of current trends around the globe.
The starting point is that there are serious challenges to the modern institution of
sovereignty: both from ‘above’ and from ‘below’. Here, I will reflect upon two popular
instances of such challenges. One is the case of the European Union (EU), whereas the
second one is the evolution of sovereignty in most of the developing countries.1. Form I. Pooled sovereignty in the European Union
The conception that a state must have control of its internal and external policies and be
free of external infringement on its policies is a European design dating from the 16th and
17th centuries. Ironically, however, it is the same Europe, the birthplace of the nation-
state, which moved over the concept of modern state and passed to the post-modern phase.
The modern state was defined by its unitary character. The state was involved in every
aspect of the internal and external affairs. Economically, the modern state was more
introvert than extrovert. At the political level, the state had vastly expanded regulative
powers and it was a ‘nation-state’. The nationalism contained two distinct elements:
Gesellschaft, the community of citizens within defined borders; and Geimenschaft, the
community of people defined by the nation. Non-intervention and reciprocity were the sine
qua non of the system.
Post-modern European states, on the other hand, operate within a much more complex,
cross-cutting network of governance, based upon the collapse of the notorious distinction
between foreign and domestic realms. Economically, they are transnationally integrated
and have globalised economies. Their economies are more extrovert than introvert. The
economic globalisation is even one of the strongest incentives for states to bargain with
their sovereignty in order to gain the advantage of becoming the part of a strong whole to
be able to resist the negative effects of globalisation more efficiently. Thus, the process of
globalisation by demonstrating the inability of the nation-state to attain desired outcomes
through independent action paves the way for Europeanisation.
It goes without saying that the European Union is an organization that drastically
challenges whatever that is conventional. For many scholars obsessed about classifying
the actors on the world stage, the EU appeared as a nightmare with its matrix of linkages
and unique character. Rather then attempting to realize the impossible by trying to squeeze
the Union into the traditional classifications, one should develop an understanding of the
matchless character of the EU.
The EU is an actor sui generis; a ‘post-modern polity’; it is a ‘multiperspectival entity’
which has multiple presences in distinct foreign policy areas. The EU is not a federation
certainly, and it is much more than a simple international organization.
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structure is another novelty for the conventional arguments. As put by William Wallace,
the EU is widely agreed to constitute a political system, “a framework for governance with
some state-like qualities above the state level” [5]. Some would describe it as a ‘quasi-
state’, or as an ‘international state’, or as a post-modern pattern of government in a post-
modern European order.
In the end of this process towards more supra-nationalism emerges multi-level
governance, which renders the two elements of Gesellschaft and Geimenschaft less
meaningful. The nation now has alternatives to identify itself with; the ‘European citizen’
as supra-national identity and particular sub-national identities. Thus, the processes of
micro-regionalisation and Europeanisation ensue side by side [4]. This is what Ford
identifies as ‘the new layers of Europe’ [1]. While European governments are giving up the
key responsibilities to the European Union, local authorities decide how to use about 70%
of public works spending in Europe, and in many countries it is the regions that set their
own transportation facilities, enforce environmental standards, and administer social
services [1].
All in all, the EU is inconsistent with conventional sovereignty rules. With each phase
of European integration, the member countries redefine national sovereignty. The process
of localization undermines the ‘nation’-state and shakes the understanding of absolute
control of the government within its borders. The process supra-nationalism, on the other
hand, questions the external sovereignty of states and the fundamental principles of the
Westphalian state system, most importantly the non-intervention principle.2. Form II. Truncated sovereignty in the Third World countries
Similar to the EU member countries, many states in the developing world also suffer
from a loss of their sovereign rights. Interestingly enough, these states too face almost the
same forces working against their sovereign powers. On the more general level, not the
requirements of a regional bloc, but ‘wild’ global currents as well as international
institutions and law limit their area of manoeuvre.
Today, with the exemption of a few countries around the globe, each developing
country is obliged to go along with the rules of global finance, trade and investment.
Again, through pressures to observe a certain rule of conduct, these countries are
increasingly forced to follow what the ‘international community’ considers as legal.
Human rights organizations are for instance highly powerful in many instances.
Furthermore, when the state definitively fails in these countries, the international
community often moves in to handle the country’s internal problems.
There is no question today that norms of human rights pose a fundamental challenge to
norms of state sovereignty especially in developing countries. The debate between those
who argue for continued utility of respect for independence and non-intervention as the
fundamental principles of the international system, and those who stand for human rights
precedence over the rights of states has been concluded in favour of the latter. In the post-
modern era, the universalism of human rights overwhelms the principle of sovereignty.
Intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country seems legitimised by the images flowing
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This is not to say that the legitimacy of an intervention is always certain especially when
humanitarian cause is overshadowed by self-interest as seems to be case in the recent
US-led intervention in Iraq.
International intervention in some of these countries stems from domestic challenges to
state sovereignty and the way nation-states react to these demands in the first place. In the
post-war international environment, one sees increasingly strong demands from below.
Multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious societies are destabilized by micro-movements. We
often observe that armed groups, whatever they are called, rule certain regions of a country
where the nation-state wields no power. Even more often we see armed struggles between
the local groups and the state going on for years, even decades. The provincial challenge is
not necessarily new, or always bloody, but it is much more common and much more
assertive against the modern concept of state sovereignty in the post-modern world.
In conclusion, global currents put tremendous pressures on the norm of sovereignty.
Nation-states are reacting to the pressures in various ways. While relatively more
advanced countries have formed regional blocs as shields against the vagaries of global
economy and politics, many states in the Third World are suffering from forces originating
from above as well as below. There is an urgent need for the global community to develop
a fresh approach towards the concept of sovereignty, and norms and rules of conduct in the
international system that will hopefully replace the current system which is ad hoc and
open to abuse by hegemonic power(s).References
[1] P. Ford, The new layers of Europe, available at http://search.csmonitor.com7durable/2000/05/22/p1s2.htm
accessed on 30.12.2003.
[2] B. Ghali, quoted in G.B. Helman, S.R. Ratner, Saving failed states, Foreign Affairs 89 (1992–1993) 10.
[3] R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2003. p. 281.
[4] M. Longo, European integration: between micro-regionalism and globalism, Journal of Common Market
Studies 41 (3) (2003) 486.
[5] W. Wallace, The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox, Political Studies XLVII (1999) 518.
